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The	Evil	Demon	Inside∗	Nicholas	Silins	Cornell	University	Penultimate	Draft	Final	Version	to	Appear	in	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research			Abstract:	this	paper	examines	how	new	evil	demon	problems	could	arise	for	our	access	to	the	internal	world	of	our	own	minds.		I	start	by	arguing	that	the	internalist/externalist	debate	in	epistemology	has	been	widely	misconstrued---we	need	to	reconfigure	the	debate	in	order	to	see	how	it	can	arise	about	our	access	to	the	internal	world.		I	then	argue	for	the	coherence	of	scenarios	of	radical	deception	about	our	own	minds,	and	I	use	them	to	defend	a	properly	formulated	internalist	view	about	our	access	to	our	minds.		The	overarching	lesson	is	that	general	epistemology	and	the	specialized	epistemology	of	introspection	need	to	talk---each	has	much	to	learn	from	each	other.			Suppose	you’re	not	radically	deceived	by	an	evil	demon,	and	consider	your	counterpart	who	is.		Things	seem	just	the	same	way	to	your	twin	as	they	do	to	you,	and	your	twin	has	the	same	beliefs	about	how	things	are	as	you,	but	your	twin	is	in	general	not	reliable	about	how	things	around	them	are.		Are	their	beliefs	about	the	external	world	still	just	as	justified	as	yours?		If	your	answer	is	“yes,”	you	are	an	internalist	in	epistemology.		If	your	answer	is	“no,”	you	are	an	externalist	in	epistemology.		(If	your	answer	is	“maybe,”	it	is	time	to	pick	a	side.)	The	case	I	have	just	described	poses	the	“new	evil	demon”	problem	in	epistemology,	introduced	by	Cohen	and	Lehrer	(1983).		The	problem	arises	for	
                                                
∗	For	their	help	with	this	paper,	I’d	like	to	thank	Robert	Beddor,	Alex	Byrne,	Ophelia	Deroy,	Julien	Dutant,	Carl	Ginet,	Anna	Giustina,	Anil	Gomes,	Patrick	Greenough,	Uriah	Kriegel,	Neil	Mehta,	Lisa	Miracchi,	Ram	Neta,	Adam	Pautz,	Antonia	Peacocke,	Abelard	Podgorski,	Adriana	Renero,	Eric	Schwitzgebel,	Sydney	Shoemaker,	Susanna	Siegel,	Declan	Smithies,	Weng	Hong	Tang,	Hannah	Trees,	Ru	Ye,	Jonna	Vance,	Jonathan	Vogel,	Timothy	Williamson,	and	two	anonymous	referees.		Special	thanks	to	Lauren	Ashwell,	Karen	Bennett,	Pericles	Lewis,	Odette	Lienau,	Andrew	McGonigal,	Carlos	Montemayor,	David	Orr,	Padmaja	Rajagopalan,	Aziz	Rana,	Mira	Seo,	and	Pramod	Vijayasankar.	I’m	also	grateful	to	audiences	at	workshops	or	other	events	at	the	University	of	Geneva,	the	Institut	Jean-Nicod,	the	Universidad	Panamericana,	the	Ohio	State	University,	Oxford	University,	Bled,	the	University	of	Bergen,	Nanyang	Technological	University	and	the	National	University	of	Singapore.				
	2	
those	externalist	theories	that	seem	to	predict	the	victim	lacks	justified	beliefs	about	the	external	world,	given	the	failure	of	the	victim’s	beliefs	to	be	knowledgeable	or	reliable	or	otherwise	properly	connected	to	the	truth.		Strikingly,	self-described	externalists	have	tried	to	accommodate	some	internalist	verdicts	about	the	case	(Goldman	1986,	2011;	Sosa	2003),	to	explain	(false)	internalist	verdicts	about	the	case	(Lasonen-Aarnio	forthcoming;	Williamson	forthcoming),	or	to	construct	analogues	of	the	new	evil	demon	scenario	about	which	internalist	verdicts	are	implausible	(Srinivasan	forthcoming).		Most	or	all	epistemologists,	internalist	or	externalist,	seem	to	agree	that	the	new	evil	demon	scenario	raises	a	challenge	for	externalist	views.		 My	aim	here	is	to	examine	how	new	evil	demon	problems	might	arise	for	our	access	to	the	internal	world	of	our	own	minds.		In	part	1,	I	will	argue	that	the	internalist/externalist	debate	in	epistemology	has	actually	been	widely	misconstrued—we	need	to	reconfigure	the	debate	in	order	to	see	how	it	can	arise	about	our	access	to	the	internal	world.		In	part	2,	I	will	argue	for	the	coherence	of	scenarios	of	radical	deception	about	our	own	minds,	and	I	will	use	the	scenarios	to	defend	a	properly	formulated	internalist	view	about	our	access	to	our	minds.		The	overarching	lesson	will	be	that	general	epistemology	and	the	specialized	epistemology	of	introspection	need	to	talk—each	has	much	to	learn	from	each	other.		
1.	Understanding	Internalism	vs.	Externalism	about	Introspection	
	 First,	some	preliminaries	about	“introspective	justification”,	my	main	focus	throughout	the	paper.		To	get	the	phenomenon	in	view,	consider	how	you	usually	access	what	you're	thinking	about,	and	contrast	how	other	people	access	what	you're	thinking	about.		While	other	people	can	have	justification	to	believe	you're	thinking	that	it's	time	for	lunch	(L),	you	have	justification	to	believe	L	in	a	way	such	that	other	people	can't	have	justification	to	believe	L	in	that	way.		The	crucial	point	here	is	negative,	leaving	open	the	positive	details	about	how	introspective	justification	works.		Whether	or	not	you	have	anything	like	perceptions	of	your	own	
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mental	states,	you	do	have	justification	for	beliefs	about	your	own	mind	in	a	way	that	does	not	extend	to	your	beliefs	about	other	minds.		In	the	terms	of	Byrne	(2005),	introspective	justification	is	“peculiar”.		For	all	we	have	said,	introspective	justification	need	not	be	perceptual	in	any	way,	despite	the	misleading	term	of	"introspection",	and	introspective	justification	need	not	be	superior	to	your	justification	for	beliefs	about	other	minds,	or	"privileged"	in	the	sense	of	Byrne	(2005).		This	neutrality	is	all	for	the	good,	allowing	us	to	accommodate	as	many	approaches	to	introspection	as	possible.				 I'll	now	review	a	standard	picture	of	what	internalist/externalist	debates	in	epistemology	are	about.		I'll	then	revise	that	picture	by	showing	how	it	neglects	the	possibility	of	internalist/externalist	debates	about	introspective	justification.			 As	we	saw	in	the	introduction,	internalist	views	are	standardly	motivated	by	consideration	of	new	evil	demon	scenarios.		The	lesson	is	supposed	to	be	that	you	and	your	counterpart	are	equally	justified	in	your	beliefs,	regardless	of	how	you	are	hooked	up	to	the	world.		Since	Conee	and	Feldman’s	influential	“Internalism	Defended”	(2001),	it	has	become	common	to	think	of	internalism	in	epistemology	as	then	potentially	coming	in	two	flavors,	each	trying	to	specify	what	you	and	your	deceived	counterpart	importantly	have	in	common	(see	e.g.	Srinivasan	2015:	276).		According	to	the	first	version	of	internalism,			 (Accessibilism):	If	two	people	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	introspective	and	a	priori	justification	to	believe,	then	they	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	justification	to	believe.		This	approach	proceeds	in	epistemological	terms	to	identify	a	base	for	justification,	and	privileges	the	sources	of	introspection	and	a	priori	reflection.		As	Conee	and	Feldman	note,	accessibilists	vary	in	terms	of	what	exactly	they	privilege,	ranging	from	"direct	access"	to	"suitable	awareness"	to	"introspective	awareness"	(2001:	2).		I	will	generally	pass	over	these	variations	here	(Alston	1986:	91-2	surveys	further	candidates).		 The	second	flavor	of	internalism	is	quite	different:		
	4	
(Mentalism):	If	two	people	are	the	same	with	respect	to	their	internal	mental	states,	then	they	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	justification	to	believe.		Here	the	relevant	mental	states	are	meant	to	be	specified	somehow	other	than	through	introspective	access.		For	example,	Wedgwood	(2002,	forthcoming)	or	Schoenfield	(2015)	focus	on	those	of	your	mental	states	that	are	non-factive,	i.e.	such	that	you	can	bear	them	to	the	proposition	that	p	even	if	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.		For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	will	simply	stick	with	the	place-holder	"internal	mental	state."1		 According	to	philosophers	such	as	Timothy	Williamson	(2000,	2007)	or	Declan	Smithies	(2012a),	internalism	is	ultimately	best	understood	along	the	lines	of	accessibilism	(where	Williamson	goes	on	to	reject	accessibilism	because	of	its	allegedly	excessive	accessibilist	demands).		According	to	philosophers	such	as	Conee	and	Feldman,	Wedgwood,	and	Schoenfield,	internalism	is	ultimately	best	understood	along	the	lines	of	mentalism.		On	a	more	ecumenical	approach,	internalism	can	be	understood	in	either	way,	where	neither	has	a	better	claim	to	capture	the	spirit	of	internalism.		 I	will	now	argue	that	all	of	these	options	are	wrong.				 I	will	first	argue	that	Accessibilism	is	not	the	way	to	understand	internalism,	and	not	even	a	way	to	understand	internalism.		The	core	problem	is	simple.		Given	that	the	antecedent	of	Accessibilism	is	formulated	using	the	notion	of	justification,	Accessibilism	cannot	be	used	to	formulate	an	internalist/externalist	debate	about	introspective	or	a	priori	justification	themselves.		The	approach	takes	introspective	and	a	priori	justification	as	given,	without	incorporating	any	stand	on	their	own	requirements.		 To	see	that	Accessibilism	cannot	be	used	to	formulate	an	internalist/externalist	debate	about	introspective	and	a	priori	justification,	look	at	what	happens	when	we	try:	
                                                1	Whether	the	restriction	to	non-factive	mental	states	is	adequate	is	not	so	clear---perhaps	some	internalists	would	want	to	assign	a	role	to	mental	states	that	are	not	propositional	attitudes	at	all.		Consider	the	role	traditionally	assigned	to	mental	states	such	as	acquaintance.				
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	 (Accessibilism+):	If	two	people	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	introspective	and	a	priori	justification	to	believe,	then	they	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	introspective	and	a	priori	justification	to	believe.		This	view	is	trivial,	and	must	be	accepted	by	all	regardless	of	their	orientation.		The	core	of	internalist/externalist	debates	in	epistemology	cannot	then	be	about	Accessibilism.		Accessibilism	is	not	a	statement	of	one	version	of	internalism.			Given	its	neutrality	about	the	character	of	introspective	and	a	priori	justification,	it	fails	to	be	a	statement	of	any	version	of	internalism.	 		 For	an	example	of	the	approach	I	am	criticizing,	consider	Neta	and	Pritchard	(2007),	who	distinguish	the	following	array	of	claims:		 (1)	S’s	epistemic	justification	for	believing	that	p	is	constituted	solely	by	S’s	mental	states.		(2)	S’s	epistemic	justification	for	believing	that	p	is	constituted	solely	by	facts	that	S	can	know	by	reflection	alone.		(3)	S’s	epistemic	justification	for	believing	that	p	is	constituted	solely	by	properties	that	S	has	in	common	with	her	recently	envatted	physical	duplicate	(2007:	382).		According	to	a	view	they	defend	on	behalf	of	John	McDowell,	(1)	and	(2)	are	true	although	(3)	is	false.2		Nevertheless,	they	hold	that	McDowell's	acceptance	of	(2)	"seems	to	make	his	view	internalist	(2007:	386)."		The	idea	seems	to	be	that	accepting	an	accessibilist	claim	is	sufficient	to	make	you	an	internalist.		However,	there	is	room	for	internalist/externalist	disputes	over	what	it	takes	to	know	by	reflection	alone	that	p.		In	particular,	there	is	room	for	internalist/externalist	disputes	over	what	it	takes	to	have	any	associated	justification	to	believe	that	p.		Accepting	(2)	is	then	not	a	way	of	committing	to	internalism,	given	that	(2)	is	itself	open	to	internalist/externalist	disputes.		 As	an	objection,	someone	might	say	that	I	have	misconstrued	the	accessibilist	approach	by	formulating	it	as	a	supervenience	thesis.		According	to	proponents	of	internalism	such	as	Smithies	(2012a,	forthcoming),	and	opponents	such	as	Lasonen-
                                                2	Pritchard	gives	an	extended	further	defense	of	a	similar	position	in	his	2012	book.	
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Aarnio	(2014),	internalism	is	to	be	understood	as	the	following	sort	of	level-connection	thesis:		 (Levels	Accessibilism):	If	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	P,	then	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	P.		This	approach	gets	us	a	non-trivial	form	of	Accessibilism	about	introspective	justification:		 (Levels	Accessibilism	+):	If	you	have	introspective	justification	to	believe	that	P,	then	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	P.			In	response,	I	would	say	that	the	levels	approach	has	the	same	sort	of	problem	as	the	initial	supervenience	approach—the	levels	approach	is	silent	about	the	nature	of	the	higher-level	justification	the	view	demands.		The	view	leaves	open	the	possibility	that,	in	order	to	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	you	must	have	some	reliabilist	or	otherwise	externalist	form	of	justification	to	believe	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	p.		Figuratively	speaking,	the	view	only	says	that,	if	you	have	a	scoop	of	justification	at	the	first	floor,	then	you	also	have	a	scoop	at	the	second	floor,	and	so	on,	without	telling	us	more	about	what	it	is	that	you	have	a	scoop	of	at	any	floor.		The	view	makes	only	a	structural	claim	about	justification,	without	further	information	about	what	stands	in	the	structure,	leaving	us	without	a	distinctively	internalist	form	of	the	view.		 To	further	bring	out	that	Levels	Accessibilism	is	not	itself	a	version	of	internalism,	we	may	return	to	new	evil	demon	scenarios.		Suppose	you	are	justified	in	believing	that	you	are	sitting	down,	and	consider	your	radically	deceived	internal	duplicate	with	the	same	belief—is	that	person	justified	in	his	or	her	belief?		Levels	Accessibilism	is	entirely	silent	about	how	to	compare	the	cases.		It	predicts	that	you	have	higher-level	justification,	since	we	built	in	that	you	have	justification	at	the	ground	floor.		But	it	says	nothing	about	whether	your	deceived	counterpart	has	
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justification	at	any	level.		Indeed,	even	the	following	strengthened	form	of	Levels	Accessibilism	is	also	silent	about	the	comparison	across	cases:		 (Strong	Levels	Accessibilism):	You	have	justification	to	believe	that	P	if	and	only	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	P.		On	the	approach	I	am	taking,	if	a	view	fails	to	predict	equal	justification	in	new	evil	demon	scenarios	(while	allowing	for	their	possibility),	it	is	not	a	form	of	internalism.		To	defend	my	approach,	I	would	emphasize	that	we	need	some	relatively	pre-theoretical	way	of	grounding	our	discussion,	to	avoid	having	a	merely	terminological	dispute.		Given	the	traditional	role	of	new	evil	demon	scenarios	as	focal	points	for	dispute	between	internalists	and	externalists,	those	cases	seem	to	be	the	best	way	of	grounding	our	discussion.				 Let’s	now	return	to	the	initial	supervenience	statement	of	Accessibilism.		To	defend	using	it	to	capture	internalism,	someone	might	insist	that	internalism	is	trivially	true	about	introspective	and	a	priori	justification,	although	internalism	is	not	trivially	true	about	other	forms	of	justification.		On	this	approach,	Accessibilism	remains	a	good	way	to	understand	internalist/externalist	debates	about	those	areas	where	there	is	room	for	internalist/externalist	dispute.		To	see	why	there	needs	to	be	room	for	internalist/externalist	debate	about	introspective	justification,	reconsider	you	and	your	deceived	counterpart.		Arguably	you	have	introspective	justification	to	believe	you	are	in	various	factive	mental	states	such	as	seeing	that	the	sun	is	shining,	or	remembering	that	you	ate	oatmeal	for	breakfast.		After	all,	you	can	come	to	a	justified	belief	that	you	are	in	such	states	in	a	way	such	that	no	one	else	can	in	that	way.		Now,	an	externalist	would	say	your	deceived	counterpart	does	not	have	any	justification	to	believe	that	they	are	in	such	factive	mental	states,	given	how	unreliable	your	counterpart	is	about	what	factive	mental	states	they	are	in.		Here	there	is	room	for	internalists	and	externalists	to	disagree	about	whether	the	pair	of	subjects	is	the	same	with	respect	to	introspective	justification.		Still,	the	externalist	remains	free	to	endorse	Accessibilism.		If	you	and	your	deceived	twin	differ	with	respect	to	introspective	justification,	then	you	and	
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your	twin	fail	to	be	counterexamples	to	Accessibilism—the	antecedent	of	the	thesis	simply	fails	to	apply	to	the	pair	of	you.	It	is	important	that	Accessibilism	fails	to	be	an	articulation	of	internalism.		According	to	some	critics,	internalism	is	false	because	it	makes	accessibilist	demands	that	are	too	strong	for	us	to	satisfy.3		Whether	or	not	the	critics	are	right	about	our	ability	to	satisfy	accessibilist	demands,	there	is	room	for	internalism	to	be	true	even	if	Accessibilism	is	false.		While	some	mentalists	have	made	a	similar	observation,	my	point	is	that	objections	to	Accessibilism	do	not	target	any	version	of	internalism,	let	alone	one	version	of	internalism.	4		A	similar	point	can	be	made	in	response	to	problem	cases	for	Accessibilism	presented	by	Siegel	(2012,	2017).		In	Siegel’s	key	cases	of	“bad	cognitive	penetration”,	two	people	are	the	same	with	respect	to	introspective	justification,	although	very	different	in	terms	of	the	hidden	etiology	of	their	perceptual	experience.		In	particular,	the	role	of	prejudice	in	generating	one	person’s	perception	arguably	makes	the	pair	differ	with	respect	to	justification,	in	a	way	that	goes	under	their	introspective	radars.		We	do	have	a	challenge	here	to	Accessibilism,	but	not	yet	to	any	version	of	internalism.5			Now	setting	Accessibilism	aside,	the	standard	alternative	would	be	to	understand	internalism	about	introspective	justification	along	mentalist	lines:			 (Mentalism	+):	If	two	people	have	the	same	internal	mental	states,	then	they	are	the	same	with	respect	to	what	they	have	introspective	justification	to	believe.		We	have	made	some	progress:	this	formulation	does	leave	room	for	internalist/externalist	disputes	about	our	access	to	our	factive	mental	states.		The	formulation	does	not	leave	clear	enough	room	for	internalist/externalist	disputes	about	our	access	to	our	internal	mental	states.		The	classic	approach	would	be	to	set	up	the	debate	via	a	new	evil	demon	scenario.		And	the	usual	recipe	for	such	
                                                3	See	Williamson	(2000,	2007),	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2014)	or	Srinivasan	(2015).	4	See	Wedgwood	(2002,	forthcoming)	or	Schoenfield	(2015).		The	possibility	of	internalism	without	Accessibilism	is	perhaps	suggested	as	early	as	Sosa	(1999:	146-148).	5	Puddifoot	(2016)	argues	in	a	similar	fashion	to	Siegel	against	Accessibilism,	using	pairs	of	subjects	who	differ	with	respect	to	their	putatively	inaccessible	implicit	biases,	and	arguably	also	with	respect	to	their	justification	of	their	beliefs.		See	Toribio	(2018)	for	a	response.		
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a	scenario	would	be	to	hold	internal	mental	states	fixed,	and	to	vary	the	relation	between	internal	mental	states	and	the	relevant	domain	of	the	internalist/externalist	dispute.		Internalists	would	then	hold	that	your	beliefs	are	justified	even	in	the	scenario	where	they	are	systematically	mistaken.		But	we	can’t	hold	someone’s	internal	mental	states	fixed,	and	vary	whether	they	have	true	beliefs	about	what	internal	mental	states	they	are	in.		If	one	person	is	systematically	mistaken	in	believing	that	they	are	in	internal	mental	states	M1…Mn,	and	another	person	is	by	and	large	correct	in	believing	that	they	are	in	internal	mental	states	M1…Mn,	they	can’t	also	be	in	the	same	internal	mental	states.			If	you	use	the	classic	recipe,	you	can’t	cook	up	a	coherent	new	evil	demon	scenario	about	our	access	to	our	internal	mental	states.		Here	the	problem	is	not	directly	that	Mentalism+	is	trivially	true,	but	rather	that	it	is	impossible	to	formulate	the	classic	sort	of	scenario	an	internalist	would	use	to	motivate	it,	and	that	an	externalist	might	use	to	reject	it.6				 Contrary	to	received	wisdom,	a	fully	general	version	of	internalism	can't	be	understood	either	along	accessibilist	lines,	or	along	mentalist	lines.		On	the	alternative	approach	I	will	promote,	arguably	tracing	all	the	way	back	to	Goldman	(1979)	and	Cohen	and	Lehrer	(1983),	the	core	issue	at	stake	is	the	kind	of		truth-connection	constitutively	required	for	justification.		The	question	is	about	how	we	get	justification	from	a	given	source,	and	specifically	about	whether	the	ability	of	a	source	to	justify	beliefs	comes	from	its	ability	to	supply	true	beliefs.		On	this	approach,	contrary	to	that	taken	by	Alston	(1986)	and	many	others,	formulations	of	externalism	strictly	speaking	come	first,	with	versions	of	internalism	then	constructed	as	their	denials.						 Externalist	views	come	on	a	spectrum	here	according	to	how	strong	a	truth-connection	they	demand.		For	example,	a	view	framed	in	terms	of	infallibility	will	be	more	externalist	than	a	view	framed	in	terms	of	reliability.		To	demarcate	the	
                                                6	For	discussion	of	whether	impossible	new	evil	demon	cases	could	still	be	useful	in	adjudicating	internalist/externalist	disputes,	see	Miracchi	(forthcoming).		Even	if	Miracchi	is	right	that	some	(subtly)	metaphysically	impossible	scenarios	are	still	useful,	I	would	say	that	her	point	does	not	carry	over	to	new	evil	demon	scenarios	for	internal	mental	states:	they	wear	their	incoherence	on	their	face,	and	are	not	subtly	impossible	scenarios.	
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externalist	range	of	the	spectrum	of	the	various	truth-connections	one	might	demand,	I	say	a	view	is	externalist	just	in	case	it	predicts	an	absence	of	justification	in	evil	demon	scenarios	of	systematic	error.		These	are	cases	where	a	source	is	not	"reliable"	on	my	preferred	use	of	the	term	(more	at	the	end	of	2.2.	about	further	flavors	of	reliability).		In	using	demon	scenarios	to	demarcate	externalism,	I	rely	on	my	earlier	point	that	we	need	to	avoid	having	a	merely	terminological	dispute	about	how	to	capture	“externalism”	and	“internalism”,	and	that	evil	demon	scenarios	give	us	a	ladder	to	see	the	key	substantive	issue	at	stake.				Now	that	I	have	characterized	externalism,	I	can	describe	a	further	important	problem	for	using	Mentalism	to	try	to	capture	internalism.		Mentalism	(and	Accessibilism)	are	stated	as	supervenience	theses,	telling	us	that	if	two	people	are	the	same	with	respect	to	such	and	such	factors,	then	they	will	be	the	same	with	respect	to	justification.		They	do	not	explicitly	address	what	justifies	your	beliefs,	or	what	makes	it	the	case	that	whatever	privileged	source	is	able	to	justify	your	beliefs.		In	the	case	of	Mentalism,	this	is	a	serious	problem,	since	Mentalism	ends	up	being	compatible	with	a	paradigmatically	externalist	form	of	reliabilism,	even	though	Mentalism	is	stated	in	terms	of	internal	mental	states.		To	see	the	problem,	consider	views	on	which	you	visually	experience	a	color	only	if	your	visual	experiences	of	that	color	reliably	track	it.		Two	people	could	agree	about	the	account	of	color	experience,	and	yet	disagree	about	whether	the	reliability	of	your	experience	in	any	way	accounts	for	the	justification	you	get	from	your	visual	experiences	for	color	beliefs.		Even	if	your	experience	of	redness	must	be	reliable	to	be	an	experience	of	redness,	the	reliability	of	your	experience	could	still	be	an	idle	wheel	when	it	comes	to	justification.		Either	way,	Mentalism	turns	out	to	be	compatible	with	paradigmatically	externalist	positions	in	epistemology—duplicates	with	respect	to	internal	mental	states	could	still	turn	out	to	be	duplicates	with	respect	to	reliability,	and	so	could	still	be	duplicates	with	respect	to	justification	even	if	an	externalist	form	of	reliabilism	is	true.7		Mentalism	does	not	capture	internalism.			
                                                7	For	views	that	combine	externalist	individuation	of	mental	states	with	externalism	in	epistemology,	see	Burge	(2003)	or	Sawyer	and	Majors	(2005).	For	some	recent	discussion	of	the	combined	approach,	see	Gerken	(forthcoming).	
	11	
	 It	is	by	no	means	novel	to	understand	externalism	as	accounting	for	justification	in	terms	of	connections	to	truth,	similar	formulations	can	be	found	as	early	as	Goldman	(1979).8		However,	theorists	who	use	such	formulations	do	not	address	the	limitations	of	mentalist	or	accessibilist	formulations	of	internalism,	and	sometimes	still	use	mentalist	formulations	of	internalism	(e.g.	Miracchi	forthcoming:	2).		Since	the	letter	of	Mentalism	does	not	say	anything	about	truth-connections,	we	do	not	have	a	transparently	exhaustive	set	up	of	the	debate	if	we	use	Mentalism	to	capture	internalism	and	truth-connections	to	capture	externalism.		To	set	up	the	debate	in	an	exhaustive	way,	we	need	to	formulate	internalism	simply	as	the	negation	of	externalism.		And	to	repeat	the	point	from	the	previous	paragraph,	Mentalism	even	turns	out	to	be	compatible	with	externalism.		 A	further	lesson	here	is	that	verdicts	about	new	evil	demon	scenarios	are	not	at	stake	in	all	internalist/externalist	disputes.		New	evil	demon	scenarios	are	instead	a	useful	way	into	the	debate,	and	a	typically	convenient	proxy	for	the	core	issue	at	stake.		However,	we	cannot	always	set	up	externalist/internalist	debates	by	constructing	a	typical	new	evil	demon	pair	of	cases,	and	asking	whether	the	subjects	in	it	are	equally	justified.		In	the	case	of	internal	mental	states,	typical	new	evil	demon	scenarios	are	impossible	to	construct—we	cannot	hold	the	subject's	perspective	fixed,	and	at	the	same	time	vary	the	internal	mental	states	that	in	part	constitute	their	perspective.		Nevertheless,	we	can	still	count	a	view	as	externalist	according	to	the	strength	of	the	truth-connection	it	uses	to	account	for	justified	beliefs	about	your	internal	mental	states.			 In	sum,	a	standard	approach	about	how	to	understand	internalist/externalist	disputes	in	epistemology	is	mistaken.		First,	Accessibilism	fails	to	capture	any	form	of	internalism.		Second,	Mentalism	fails	to	capture	internalism	about	introspective	justification	in	particular.		To	set	up	internalist/externalist	debates	across	the	board,	we	should	instead	understand	internalist	and	externalist	views	as	coming	on	a	spectrum,	where	views	are	more	externalist	as	they	account	for	justification	in	terms	of	a	stronger	connection	to	truth	
                                                8	See	also	Graham	(2012),	Gerken	(forthcoming),	or	Miracchi	(forthcoming)	
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	 In	concluding	this	section,	I	will	formulate	the	two	particular	families	of	externalism	about	introspective	justification	I	will	oppose	in	the	remainder	of	the	paper.				 First	consider			 (Constitutivism):	For	any	mental	state	M,	if	you	are	introspectively	justified	in	believing	that	you	are	in	M,	your	belief	that	you	are	in	M	is	justified	at	least	part	in	virtue	of	your	being	in	mental	state	M.			Here	you	cannot	have	an	introspectively	justified	belief	that	is	false,	due	to	the	nature	of	introspective	justification.		On	the	approach	to	understanding	the	externalist/internalist	debate	I	have	defended,	this	is	then	an	extreme	form	of	externalism	about	introspective	justification.9				 I	will	also	oppose	the	following	weaker	claim:		(Introspective	Reliabilism):	For	any	mental	state	M,	if	you	are	introspectively	justified	in	believing	that	you	are	in	M,	then	your	belief	that	you	are	in	M	is	justified	at	least	in	part	in	virtue	of	being	formed	in	a	reliable	way.		According	to	this	view,	on	my	intended	reading	of	"reliable",	introspection	will	not	give	justification	in	any	demon	scenario	in	which	it	systematically	leads	to	false	beliefs.		Introspective	Reliabilism	is	often	assumed	by	critics	of	the	reliability	of	introspection	such	as	Dennett	(1998)	or	Schwitzgebel	(2008),	who	seem	to	think	that	a	lack	of	introspective	justification	will	follow	from	a	lack	of	reliability.10		The	view	might	also	be	assumed	by	some	traditional	theorists	who	think	that	
                                                9	See	Shoemaker	(1996,	2009),	Zimmermann	(2006),	Neta	(2008),	or	Smithies	(2012b,	forthcoming).		For	a	similar	view	in	the	case	of	perceptual	justification,	consider	Johnston	(2006).		On	his	approach,	when	you	are	perceptually	justified	in	believing	that	a	is	F,	that	is	in	part	in	virtue	of	your	being	perceptually	aware	of	a's	Fness,	where	you	could	be	so	perceptually	aware	only	if	it	is	the	case	that	a	is	F.		Here	you	cannot	have	a	perceptually	justified	belief	that	is	false,	due	to	the	nature	of	perceptual	justification.		Here	I	count	this	view	as	an	extreme	form	of	externalism.	10	For	example,	Schwitzgebel	writes	that	introspective	judgments	are	not	“sound”	or	“trustworthy”	if	they	fail	to	be	reliable	(2008:	267-8),	and	states	that	they	are	“untrustworthy”	after	having	argued	for	their	unreliability	(2008:	246,	2008:	259).		(He	uses	the	same	wording	in	his	2011:	ch.	7).	That	said,	the	connection	between	being	trustworthy	and	a	source	of	justification	is	open	to	debate.		For	direct	use	of	the	term	“unjustified”,	with	a	strong	implication	that	reliability	is	necessary	for	justification,	see	Schwitzgebel	2011:	137,	139.	
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introspection	is	reliable,	and	who	think	we	have	introspective	justification	(you	could	accept	Introspective	Reliabilism	without	accepting	reliabilism	across	the	board).	 		 In	principle,	you	could	oppose	Introspective	Reliabilism	by	arguing	only	that	the	justified	status	of	introspective	beliefs	fails	to	come	from	their	reliability—perhaps	reliability	always	coincides	with	introspective	justification	while	remaining	an	idle	wheel.		In	what	follows,	I	will	defend	the	following	stronger	form	of	internalism:		 (Introspective	Internalism):	It	is	possible	to	be	introspectively	justified	in	believing	that	you	are	in	M,	even	though	your	belief	that	you	are	in	M	is	not	formed	in	a	way	that	is	reliable.		I	will	argue	that	the	reliability	of	introspective	beliefs	is	not	even	a	necessary	condition	for	introspective	justification,	taking	the	cases	of	belief	and	consciousness	in	turn.				
2.	Adjudicating	Internalism	vs.	Externalism	about	Introspective	Justification	
2.1.	Judgment	and	Belief				 I	will	now	argue	that	our	judgments	can	give	us	introspective	justification	about	our	beliefs	even	when	our	judgments	are	not	a	reliable	guide	to	what	we	believe.				 To	get	to	this	conclusion,	I	will	start	by	using	some	examples	to	clarify	what	I	have	in	mind	by	"judgment"	and	"belief".		When	someone	asks	you	your	name,	and	you	sincerely	answer	“My	name	is	N.N.”,	you	judge	that	your	name	is	N.N.		You	can	also	make	the	judgment	when	you	simply	answer	the	question	in	your	mind	but	do	not	speak	up.		We	get	an	initial	grip	on	the	idea	of	judgments	as	outer	or	inner	assertions,	but	we	do	not	have	to	build	in	that	they	go	along	with	outer	or	inner	speech—perhaps	you	can	judge	that	p	without	entertaining	any	form	of	words.		Now,	before	you	were	asked	the	question	about	your	name,	you	had	a	standing	
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belief	that	your	name	is	N.N.	without	judging	that	your	name	is	N.N.		While	we’ll	discuss	the	relation	between	judgment	and	standing	belief	further	in	what	follows,	for	now	we	may	note	one	important	difference:	judgments	are	always	conscious,	standing	beliefs	are	not	always	conscious.				 Let’s	now	look	at	how	judgments	can	justify	you	in	believing	that	you	have	this	or	that	standing	belief,	in	a	way	that	supports	Introspective	Internalism.		 I	will	start	with	the	idea	that,	when	you	answer	the	question	whether	p,	that	puts	you	in	a	position	to	answer	the	question	whether	you	believe	that	p.11		In	particular,	I	will	put	the	idea	as	follows:		 (Transparency):	When	you	judge	that	p,	you	get	introspective	justification	from	your	judgment	to	believe	that	you	believe	that	p.		 We	can	defend	Transparency	by	using	it	to	explain	what’s	wrong	with	judgments	of	the	following	“Moore-Paradoxical”	character:		 (MoPa):	P	and	I	don’t	believe	that	P.				Other	things	being	equal,	it	is	irrational	to	make	such	judgments.		As	Goldstein	(2000)	puts	it	so	well,	such	Moore-paradoxical	judgments	tend	to	be	“Mooronic”.12	When	you	judge	the	conjunction,	I	take	it	you	judge	each	of	its	conjuncts.		However,	if	Transparency	is	true,	when	you	judge	the	first	conjunct,	that	will	put	you	in	a	position	where	you	have	justification	actually	to	reject	the	second	conjunct.		You	will	now	be	irrational	in	judging	the	overall	conjunction	to	be	correct.		In	making	a	Mooronic	judgment,	you	flout	the	justification	given	to	you	by	your	judgment	that	p.	
                                                11	While	commonly	assigned	to	Evans	(1982),	the	idea	of	Transparency	arguably	traces	back	to	Edgly	(1969).		For	further	debate	about	how	to	refine	and	explain	the	Transparency	idea,	see	Moran	(2001),	Byrne	(2005),	Gertler	(2011),	Silins	(2012,	2013),	Cassam	(2014),	James	Barnett	(2016),	and	A.	Peacocke	(2017).		12	For	further	discussion	of	Moore’s	paradox	and	issues	about	self-knowledge,	see	Shoemaker	(1996)	and	(2009),	also	Smithies	(forthcoming).		
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Transparency	also	helps	to	capture	the	distinctive	ways	in	which	Mooronic	judgments	are	defective.		It	is	somehow	rationally	defective	for	you	to	judge	that	you	do	not	exist,	but	there	is	nothing	rationally	worse	about	you	judging	that	[snow	is	white	and	you	do	not	exist].		There	is	no	tension	between	judging	that	snow	is	white	and	judging	that	you	do	not	exist.		However,	there	is	a	tension	between	judging	that	snow	is	white,	and	judging	you	do	not	believe	that	snow	is	white.		To	capture	what	is	distinctively	defective	about	Mooronic	judgments,	Transparency	points	out	that	judging	one	conjunct	gives	you	justification	to	reject	the	other.		(While	someone	might	try	to	deny	Transparency's	claim	that	your	judgment	is	the	specific	source	of	your	justification,	it	is	doubtful	that	there	just	happens	to	be	a	correlation	between	judging	that	p	and	having	justification	to	believe	you	believe	that	p).	We	do	need	to	say	more	to	secure	that	judgment	is	a	source	of	specifically	introspective	justification.		When	you	judge	that	p	after	all,	that	might	also	seem	to	supply	me	with	justification	to	believe	that	you	believe	that	p.			However,	if	your	judgment	ever	does	supply	me	with	justification	to	believe	you	believe	that	p,	it	does	so	only	via	publicly	available	evidence	I	have	such	as	your	having	said	that	p.		In	contrast,	I	need	not	use	publicly	available	evidence	when	my	judgments	give	me	reason	to	believe	that	I	believe	that	p.		Also,	if	your	judgment	ever	gives	me	reason	to	believe	you	believe	that	p,	I	must	rely	on	the	premise	that	you	have	judged	that	p.		In	my	own	case,	I	do	not	need	to	rely	on	the	premise	that	I	have	judged	that	p.		To	see	why,	consider	the	odd	case	of	a	thorough-going	skeptic	about	whether	judgments	exist,	who	makes	a	judgment	of	the	form	MoPa.		The	judgment	is	still	Mooronic,	and	we	can	give	a	good	explanation	of	why	using	Transparency,	even	though	such	a	person	does	not	believe	or	otherwise	endorse	the	premise	that	she	has	judged	that	p.		Given	these	asymmetries,	it	looks	like	your	judgments	give	you	distinctively	introspective	justification	to	believe	you	believe	that	p.		 	I	have	an	offered	an	explanation	of	what	is	wrong	with	Moore-paradoxical	judgments,	but	what	about	Moore-paradoxical	beliefs?		Something	seems	rationally	defective	about	having	a	standing	belief	of	the	form	MoPa,	and	Transparency	might	seem	to	be	able	to	explain	why.		Perhaps	some	other	story	is	superior	to	
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Transparency	since	that	other	story	provides	a	uniform	treatment	of	judgment	and	belief.	 In	reply,	I	first	emphasize	that	Transparency	might	be	able	to	explain	what	is	rationally	defective	with	Mooronic	beliefs	if	beliefs	are	suitably	linked	to	dispositions	to	judgment	(see	C.	Peacocke	1998	for	such	an	approach).		Second,	in	any	case	I	take	it	to	be	more	rationally	defective	to	make	a	Moore-paradoxical	judgment	than	to	have	a	Moore-paradoxical	belief.		You	are	flouting	your	epistemic	resources	in	a	more	egregious	way	when	you	make	a	Moore-paradoxical	judgment,	where	Transparency	is	optimally	positioned	to	explain	why	(for	agreement	about	the	asymmetry	between	belief	and	judgment,	see	e.g.	Kriegel	2004:	110-1).		If	a	rival	approach	says	that	we	do	not	get	introspective	justification	from	our	judgments,	but	instead	only	from	our	beliefs	themselves	or	some	other	source,	that	approach	seems	unable	to	explain	why	it	is	worse	to	make	Moore-paradoxical	judgments	than	to	have	Moore-paradoxical	beliefs.		So	it	looks	like	Transparency	has	the	best	explanation	of	what	is	wrong	with	Mooronic	judgments.			 	Having	argued	that	we	get	introspective	justification	from	our	judgments,	I	will	now	argue	that	we	get	introspective	justification	from	our	judgments	even	when	they	are	not	a	reliable	guide	to	our	beliefs.			As	a	first	step,	consider	that	your	judging	that	p	is	not	sufficient	for	you	to	believe	that	p.		To	see	how,	consider	cases	where	your	judgment	misfires,	failing	to	reflect	your	beliefs.		For	example,	consider	how	in	a	philosophical	discussion,	you	might	assert	and	judge	that	p,	and	then	quickly	retract.		“Scratch	that,”	you	might	say,	“that’s	not	what	I	believe”.		(See	Martin	1998	for	more	discussion	of	such	philosophical	cases.)		For	a	more	quotidian	example,	suppose	you	have	been	gazing	at	photos	of	the	Sydney	Opera	House,	and	are	asked	to	identify	the	capital	of	Australia	in	a	game	of	trivia.		You	might	answer	that	the	capital	of	Australia	is	Sydney,	judging	that	is	so,	but	then	soon	correct	your	mistake,	realizing	that	is	not	what	you	believe	(Smithies	forthcoming,	ch.	5.2).13	
                                                13	For	a	sample	view	on	which	judgment	is	insufficient	for	belief,	see	C.	Peacocke	(1999),	for	an	objection,	see	Zimmermann	(2006).	For	further	discussion	of	judgment	and	belief,	and	dispositional	requirements	for	belief,	see	Schwitzgebel	(2002,	2010,	2013),	but	also	the	critical	response	to	
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How	can	such	mismatches	between	judgment	and	belief	arise?		A	plausible	diagnosis	is	that,	in	order	to	believe	that	p,	you	need	to	have	enough	dispositions	associated	with	believing	that	p.		I	will	not	take	a	stand	on	exactly	what	the	dispositions	are,	since	I	am	trying	to	convince	as	many	interlocuteurs	as	possible,	across	a	wide	range	of	views	of	what	it	takes	to	have	a	belief.		As	Schwitzgebel	(2002:	252-4)	points	out	in	his	survey	of	candidate	behavioral,	inferential,	and	phenomenal	dispositions,	there	may	not	even	be	any	particular	disposition	necessary	or	sufficient	for	belief	that	p,	perhaps	having	enough	of	a	cluster	will	do.		The	core	problem	is	that	the	conscious	surface	of	your	mental	life	when	you	judge	that	p	does	not	guarantee	the	presence	of	non-conscious	dispositions	to	underwrite	a	standing	belief	that	p.		To	use	a	toy	example,	suppose	that	believing	that	p	requires	being	disposed	to	plan	on	the	assumption	that	p.		You	can	make	a	conscious	judgment	that	p	without	having	a	disposition	to	plan	on	the	assumption	that	p.		The	same	holds	for	a	disposition	to	act	on	the	assumption	that	p,	or	a	disposition	to	infer	something	that	follows	from	the	proposition	that	p,	and	so	on.		Your	conscious	perspective	when	you	judge	that	p	will	not	necessarily	fix	what	you	will	do	across	the	range	of	circumstances	for	manifesting	dispositions	associated	with	believing	that	p.		Now,	when	you	judge	that	p,	you	might	manifest	dispositions	defined	solely	in	the	terms	of	the	actual	circumstances	in	which	you	are	judging	that	p.		But	I	take	it	that	dispositions	defined	so	narrowly	trivialize	the	view	that	beliefs	requires	dispositions,	and	are	not	the	dispositions	proponents	of	the	non-trivial	approach	had	in	mind.			An	objector	might	insist	that,	whenever	someone	judges	that	p,	they	at	least	have	a	short-lived	conscious	belief	that	p	insofar	as	they	judge	that	p.		This	objection	speaks	past	the	topic	of	our	discussion.		We	are	concerned	with	how	judgments	can	justify	you	in	self-ascribing	standing	beliefs	that	need	not	be	conscious.		The	objection	changes	the	subject	away	from	judgment’s	relation	to	standing	belief,	to	conceive	instead	of	judgment	itself	as	a	form	of	conscious	belief.			
                                                                                                                                            Schwitzgebel	by	Borgoni	(2016).		For	a	recent	book-length	defense	of	pragmatic	requirements	for	having	a	belief,	see	Zimmerman	(2018).	For	some	relevant	empirical	evidence	about	belief	attributions,	see	Murray	et	al	(2013)	or	Buckwalter	et	al	(2015).			
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There	is	a	gap	between	judgment	and	(standing)	belief.		Let’s	now	consider	how	an	evil	demon	might	insert	the	skeptical	knife.14		Suppose	that	whenever	Rene	judges	at	a	time	that	p,	an	evil	demon	typically	but	indiscernibly	ensures	that	Rene	at	that	time	fails	to	believe	that	p.		In	particular,	the	evil	demon	momentarily	erases	enough	dispositions	associated	with	believing	that	p,	so	that	Rene	ends	up	failing	to	believe	that	p	while	he	judges	that	p	and	considers	whether	he	believes	that	p.		The	demon	subsequently	restores	the	dispositions.		Here	Rene’s	use	of	the	transparency	method	is	not	reliable,	without	Rene	having	any	inkling	of	the	disruption.		(Now,	you	might	have	disagreed	with	my	use	of	dispositions	to	explain	the	gap	between	judgment	and	belief.		If	so,	you	will	also	disagree	with	some	of	my	description	of	Rene's	case.		However,	if	you	still	agree	that	it	is	possible	to	judge	that	p	without	believing	that	p,	as	when	the	quiz	contestant	missteps	in	judging	that	Sydney	is	the	capital	of	Australia,	please	substitute	in	your	own	explanation	of	the	gap	to	flesh	out	the	case	of	Rene.)						Even	though	Rene's	use	of	the	Transparency	Method	is	unreliable,	it	remains	irrational	for	Rene	to	make	a	judgment	along	the	lines	of	“p,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	p”.		And	Transparency	remains	as	good	an	explanation	of	why	as	before.		So	it	looks	like	Rene	continues	to	get	introspective	justification	to	self-ascribe	beliefs	from	his	judgments.		And	further,	Rene	still	seems	to	form	a	justified	belief	that	he	believes	that	p	when	he	does	so	on	the	basis	of	his	judgment	that	p.		Given	that	he	does	not	form	a	belief	in	a	way	that	is	reliable,	we	now	have	an	example	that	confirms	Introspective	Internalism.	We	can	use	our	example	to	raise	a	further	objection	to	the	following	particularly	strong	form	of	constitutivism:		
                                                14	Contrast	Evans,	who	writes:	“If	a	judging	subject	applies	this	procedure,	then	necessarily	he	will	gain	knowledge	of	one	of	his	own	mental	state,	even	the	most	determined	sceptic	cannot	find	here	a	gap	in	which	to	insert	his	knife	(1982,	225).”			You	might	think	that,	given	his	anti-skeptical	point,	Evans	must	be	using	“belief”	in	a	way	that	is	synonymous	with	“judgment”.		But	Evan’s	discussion	of	“self-ascription	of	a	belief”	opens	with	the	example	of	someone	asking	“Do	you	think	there	is	going	to	be	a	third	world	war?”		The	person	is	presumably	concerned	with	whether	I	have	a	standing	belief---unless	I	am	currently	stockpiling	gas	masks	or	the	like,	it	would	bizarre	to	ask	whether	I	am	occurrently	thinking	that	there	will	be	WWIII.			
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(Strong	Constitutivism):	If	you	believe	that	p,	then	you	have	introspective		justification	to	believe	you	believe	that	p;	if	you	do	not	believe	that	p,	then		you	have	introspective	justification	to	believe	you	do	not	believe	that	p.		On	this	version	of	the	view,	endorsed	by	Smithies	(2012b,	forthcoming),	absences	of	belief	are	self-intimating.		The	view	has	extraordinary	implications	for	the	case	of	Rene,	allowing	a	kind	of	introspective	bootstrapping.		We	can	use	standard	formulations	from	the	literature	to	set	up	this	instance	of	the	problem.15		Consider	that	each	time	Rene	judges	that	p,	it	looks	like	he	will	end	up	with	justification	to	believe	the	following	sort	of	conjunction:			Track	Record:	I	am	judging	that	p	but	do	not	believe	that	p.				Once	enough	justification	for	each	of	the	Track	Record	conjunctions	has	stacked	up,	it	looks	like	Rene	will	end	up	with	justification	to	believe	the	following	hypothesis	as	the	best	explanation	of	what's	going	on:			Explanation:	there	is	a	systematic	mismatch	between	my	judgments	and	my	beliefs.				But	it	is	absurd	that	Rene	could	get	even	a	low	degree	of	justification	to	believe	Explanation,	whether	or	not	Rene	can	muster	a	justified	belief	in	Explanation	on	the	basis	of	the	justification	he	has	(Smithies	is	careful	to	point	out	that	you	can	have	justification	for	a	belief	without	being	able	to	use	it	to	form	a	justified	belief	on	its	basis).		The	whole	point	of	an	evil	demon	is	meant	to	be	that	you	can	have	no	hint	of	how	your	present	appearances	are	misleading.			 Let	me	now	address	some	objections	to	my	case	for	Introspective	Internalism.		 First,	one	might	try	to	explain	away	the	internalist	verdict	about	the	case	as	tracking	some	property	other	than	justification.		For	example,	on	the	approach	taken	by	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2014,	forthcoming),	such	judgments	track	the	property	of	
                                                15	For	further	discussion	of	the	nature	of	bootstrapping	problems	and	of	who	they	might	be	problems	for,	see	Cohen	(2000),	White	(2006),	Weisberg	(2010),	or	Barnett	(2014).	
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reasonableness	rather	than	justification.		The	rough	idea	here	is	that	a	belief	is	reasonable	when	formed	on	the	basis	of	a	disposition	that	yields	knowledge	in	suitably	normal	conditions,	where	that	disposition	might	fail	to	lead	to	knowledge	in	the	thinker’s	actual	conditions.		And	perhaps	when	we	judge	that	Rene	is	justified,	we	simply	confuse	the	presence	of	reasonableness	with	the	presence	of	justification.			To	contest	the	proposed	explanation,	we	can	use	variations	of	the	original	case.		In	one	variant,	Rene	has	a	fluke-y	one-off	belief	that	he	believes	that	p	in	response	to	his	judging	that	p.		In	another	variant,	Rene	mimics	the	disposition	of	our	original	Rene,	but	only	because	of	further	manipulation	by	an	evil	demon.		In	these	variants,	Rene	does	not	manifest	any	disposition	to	believe	he	believes	that	p	on	the	basis	of	judging	that	p,	but	he	still	presumably	has	justification	to	believe	he	believes	that	p—our	earlier	Moorean	argument	applies	just	as	well	as	before.		Here	his	belief	is	not	“reasonable”	in	the	objector's	sense,	and	does	not	seem	to	be	reasonable	in	the	objector's	sense,	but	still	does	seem	to	be	justified.			There	is	also	a	more	general	problem	with	the	objectors'	strategy,	one	that	reveals	the	irrelevance	of	trying	to	explain	away	internalist	intuitions	about	Rene.		I	did	not	appeal	to	internalist	intuitions	in	setting	up	the	case—I	instead	used	consideration	of	Mooronic	judgments	to	build	an	argument.			 As	a	further	objection,	one	might	appeal	to	variant	formulations	of	reliabilism	in	epistemology.		Some	versions	of	the	approach	use	a	lower	bar	for	the	reliability	they	demand,	with	the	aim	of	predicting	that	victims	of	evil	demons	can	retain	justification.		These	versions	of	reliabilism	are	then	compatible	with	the	verdict	that	Rene	retains	introspective	justification.		For	example,	a	reliabilist	might	merely	demand	a	source	that	is	reliable	in	normal	worlds	(Goldman	1986),	or	a	source	that	is	reliable	in	the	actual	world	(Goldman	2001).16		Even	though	the	transparency	method	leads	Rene	astray	in	his	non-actual,	abnormal	world,	he	still	uses	a	method	that	is	reliable	in	the	actual	world	(ours),	and	that	is	reliable	in	normal	worlds	such	as	ours.		Some	reliabilists	therefore	have	room	to	maintain	that	Rene	gets	
                                                16	For	further	discussion	of	how	to	formulate	reliabilism,	see	Goldman	and	Beddor	SEP,	Sosa	(2001),	Comesaña	(2002),	Graham	(2017),	or	Miracchi	(forthcoming).	
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introspectively	justified	beliefs	through	the	transparency	method.		So	perhaps	my	case	for	Introspective	Internalism	fails.		I	take	the	objector	to	neglect	my	reconfiguration	in	section	1	of	the	externalist/internalist	debate.		The	test	for	externalism	I	proposed,	based	on	the	historical	role	of	new	evil	demon	scenarios,	was	whether	the	view	rules	out	the	presence	of	justification	in	cases	of	systematic	error.		According	to	the	resulting	understanding	of	Introspective	Internalism,	it	is	possible	to	be	introspectively	justified	in	believing	that	you	are	in	M,	even	if	your	belief	that	you	are	in	M	is	formed	in	a	way	that	systematically	leads	you	to	error.		The	case	of	Rene	establishes	Introspective	Internalism,	since	the	transparency	method	does	systematically	lead	him	to	error,	and	yet	still	gives	him	introspectively	justified	beliefs.		Here	it	is	beside	the	point	whether	the	transparency	method	is	reliable	in	the	actual	world,	or	in	normal	worlds—what	matters	is	that	the	method	systematically	leads	him	to	error	in	his	scenario.		In	sum,	there	might	well	be	versions	of	reliabilism	that	are	consistent	with	Introspective	Internalism.		But	these	will	simply	be	internalist	forms	of	reliabilism.				
2.3.	Consciousness	and	Attention			 In	this	section	I’ll	use	the	case	of	consciousness	outside	attention	to	argue	for	Introspective	Internalism.		Let	me	start	by	partly	clarifying	the	debate	about	whether	consciousness	requires	attention.	Rather	than	trying	to	define	terms	such	as	“experience”	or	“consciousness”,	I	will	simply	draw	your	attention	to	some	of	your	own	experiences,	such	as	your	visual	experience	of	this	text.		That’s	the	sort	of	thing	I	put	under	the	heading	of	“experience”	and	“consciousness”.		I	also	won’t	try	to	define	the	term	“attention”,	and	instead	would	like	to	draw	your	attention	to	your	attention	itself.		For	instance,	fix	your	eyes	on	the	period	at	the	end	of	this	sentence,	and	at	the	same	time	shift	your	attention	to	your	left.		That	is	the	sort	of	thing	I	put	under	the	heading	of	“attention”.	
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Now,	are	you	conscious	only	of	that	to	which	you	attend?		According	to	what	we	may	call	the	highlight	view,	the	answer	is	“no”—you	sometimes	experience	more	entities	than	those	to	which	you	attend	(be	they	objects,	properties,	or	other	entities).17		According	what	I	will	call	the	searchlight	view,	the	answer	is	“yes”—just	as	you	might	see	only	those	things	illuminated	by	a	searchlight,	you	experience	only	those	entities	to	which	you	attend.18		 Much	more	can	be	said	to	clarify	the	debate	about	consciousness	and	attention,	in	particular	by	distinguishing	different	kinds	of	attention,	but	I	will	proceed	on	the	assumption	that	we	now	have	a	good	enough	grip	on	the	key	notions	and	the	key	question.19 		 I	will	now	rehearse	a	classic	common	sense	motivation	for	the	highlight	view.	The	common	sense	motivation	is	that,	when	you	turn	your	attention	to	something	you	had	not	previously	been	attending	to,	say	a	sound	in	the	background,	it	can	seem	to	you	that	you	had	been	experiencing	the	sound	before	turning	your	attention	to	it.		The	temporal	point	here	is	important.		The	motivation	is	not	just	that,	when	I	turn	my	attention	to	the	sound,	I	experience	the	sound,	but	also	that,	when	I	turn	my	attention	to	the	sound,	I	sometimes	seem	to	have	been	experiencing	the	sound	before	I	turned	my	attention	to	it.20		 		 The	common	sense	motivation	relies	on	the	claim	that	our	memories	of	a	recent	experience	of	x	can	justify	us	in	believing	that	we	had	the	experience	of	x,	even	when	we	also	remember	that	we	were	not	attending	to	x	at	the	time.		Since	these	memories	are	distinctively	first-personal	memories	of	our	own	experience,	and	not	just	of	the	scene	experienced,	they	are	also	sources	of	introspective	justification	here	if	they	are	sources	of	justification	at	all.		Perhaps	I	can	rely	on	my	memory	of	a	scene	to	form	a	justified	belief	about	the	scene	in	a	way	you	can	too,	but	you	can’t	rely	on	your	memory	of	my	experience	to	form	a	justified	belief	about	my	experience	in	the	way	I	apparently	can.	
                                                17	See	Searle	(1992),	Koch	and	Tsuchiya	(2007),	or	Jennings	(2015).	18	See	Mack	and	Rock	(1998),	Prinz	(2011),	or	M.	A.	Cohen	et	al	(2012).	19	For	useful	further	clarificatory	discussion,	see	chapter	5	of	Wu	(2014)	or	chapter	12	of	Watzl	(2017).	20	See	Block	(1995),	and	for	related	discussion	of	the	visual	case,	see	Martin	(1992,	2001)	and	Smithies	(forthcoming).	
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Proponents	of	the	searchlight	view	have	a	response	readily	available,	according	to	which	this	common	sense	motivation	for	the	highlight	view	is	simply	an	instance	of	the	“refrigerator	light	illusion”	(cf.	Thomas	1999).		Although	a	naïve	subject	might	think	that	the	refrigerator	light	is	on	when	the	fridge	door	is	closed,	really	the	subject	has	overgeneralized	from	the	cases	in	which	the	door	is	open	and	the	light	is	on.		The	idea	is	that	we	are	doing	no	better	when	we	think	about	consciousness	and	attention.		The	“refrigerator	light	illusion”	hypothesis—henceforth	just	the	“illusion	hypothesis”—is	in	particular	that,	when	we	turn	our	attention	to	something	we	had	not	previously	been	attending	to,	we	“turn	the	light	on”	and	generate	our	conscious	experience	of	the	thing,	rather	than	ever	discovering	an	antecedent	experience	of	the	thing.		Even	if	it	does	seem	to	us	that	we	antecedently	experienced	the	thing,	we	are	misled	if	we	believe	that	we	did	antecedently	experience	the	thing.			The	illusion	hypothesis	is	in	effect	an	evil	demon	hypothesis	about	our	access	to	consciousness,	one	on	which	the	evil	demon	is	inside	us.		The	illusion	hypothesis	entails	that	our	memories	of	our	recent	conscious	experiences	in	the	absence	of	attention	are	unreliable.		 To	see	that	we	can	set	up	a	case	for	Introspective	Internalism	here,	let	us	start	by	supposing	that	the	illusion	hypothesis	is	true.		Presumably	there’s	a	possible	situation	in	which	the	hypothesis	is	true	of	us	whether	or	not	it	is	not	actually	true	of	us.		Next,	contrast	the	situation	of	an	ordinary	subject	with	that	of	the	highlight	theorist	who	has	been	challenged	with	the	illusion	hypothesis	in	a	debate.		It	could	be	that	the	highlight	theorist	ceases	to	be	justified	in	relying	on	memory	once	challenged	with	the	illusion	hypothesis	(or	not,	it’s	not	clear	how	much	of	a	challenge	the	illusion	hypothesis	poses	unless	further	evidence	is	offered	in	its	favor).		Be	that	as	it	may,	the	ordinary	subject	unaware	of	the	hypothesis	is	presumably	still	justified	in	relying	on	memory	of	her	recent	experiences	even	if	the	illusion	hypothesis	is	true.		To	see	that	this	verdict	is	plausible,	imagine	another	subject	in	the	illusion	scenario	who	seems	to	remember	consciously	hearing	the	bell	ring	even	though	she	didn’t	attend	to	it.		Without	any	reason	to	suspect	that	the	illusion	hypothesis	is	true,	this	skeptical	subject	denies	that	or	suspends	judgment	
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about	whether	she	consciously	heard	the	bell	ring	without	attending	to	it.		Such	a	stance	would	seem	justified	if	the	subject	has	gained	reason	to	suspect	that	her	memory	is	unreliable,	but	in	our	description	of	the	case	she	does	not.		A	good	explanation	of	what	has	gone	wrong	here	is	that	she	is	flouting	justification	she	receives	from	her	memory.		Going	back	now	to	the	deceived	subject	who	is	not	suspicious	of	her	memory,	she	is	introspectively	justified	in	believing	that	she	consciously	heard	the	bell	ring	without	attending	to	it,	even	though	she	in	fact	has	not	formed	her	belief	in	a	way	that	is	reliable.		Here	we	have	another	case	that	confirms	Introspective	Internalism.		 Given	how	one	can	defend	the	highlight	view,	and	given	how	searchlight	theorists	respond,	we	can	construct	another	counterexample	to	externalist	requirements	on	introspective	justification.		Our	peculiar	justification	for	beliefs	about	the	internal	world	again	stays	even	when	our	reliability	goes.		
Conclusion			 Discussions	of	introspection	are	often	conducted	in	isolation	from	general	epistemology,	without	attention	to	the	full	spectrum	of	debates	and	distinctions	out	there.		In	particular,	while	philosophers	such	as	Schwitzgebel	and	his	critics	have	debated	whether	introspection	is	reliable,	we	have	lacked	a	much-needed	internalist/externalist	debate	about	the	role	of	reliability	in	introspective	justification.21		That	said,	discussions	of	general	epistemology	themselves	suffer	from	neglecting	the	case	of	introspection.		In	particular,	when	philosophers	discuss	new	evil	demon	problems,	they	standardly	fail	to	address	whether	new	evil	demon	problems	could	arise	for	our	access	to	our	own	minds.		This	lapse	causes	serious	trouble	for	the	traditional	set	up	of	internalist/externalist	debates	in	epistemology.		In	order	to	understand	the	disagreement	properly,	we	need	to	set	aside	the	role	of	our	internal	mental	states,	as	well	as	the	role	of	access	requirements,	and	instead	focus	directly	on	what	sort	of	truth-connection	allows	us	to	understand	justification.		
                                                21	See	Schwitzgebel	(2008,	2011),	and	Bayne	and	Spener	2010,	Smithies	2013,	or	Bayne	2014.		
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